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Dynamic Government Performance:
Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence
TORUN DEWAN London School of Economics and Political Science
DAVID P. MYATT London Business School
Weuse a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government’s longevityand its performance. Ministers perform well when their careers are valuable; this is so whenthe government’s duration is expected to be long; the government’s survival depends on its
popularity; and, finally, that popularity depends on itsministers’ performance. The feedback loopbetween
performance and longevity means that multiple rational-expectations equilibria can arise:Ministers work
hard for a popular government, but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed;
these alternatives are both self-fulfilling prophecies. However, the presence of (perhaps small) random
events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique
equilibrium. We explore the dynamics that arise: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of
a government’s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the
government below a unique critical threshold.
What determines a government’s performance?What determines the longevity of a govern-ment in office? Previous theoretical and em-
pirical analyses have shed light on each of these ques-
tions in isolation. In this article we offer an integrated
theoretical account of the dynamic interplay between
government survival and performance.
A government’s performance can be thought of as
some objective measure of its success in office. Some
aspects of performance can be evaluated at an individ-
ual level: A minister’s record can be enhanced by his
policy achievements, but can also beblemishedby scan-
dal (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2010; Dewan and
Myatt 2007b, 2010), whereas a legislator’s performance
can be evaluated by his attendance and his policy ini-
tiation (Padro´ i Miquel and Snyder 2006; Dal Bo´ and
Rossi 2008). Other measures operate at an aggregate
level: Scandals can be accumulated at the government
level (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2010); there
are performance indices provided by nongovernmental
organizations (we use a World Bank index in Figure
1); performance can be related to the government’s
(presumed) objective of garnering support, such as its
popularity; and somehave used the evaluation of a gov-
ernment’s fiscal outcomes as a performance indicator
(Besley and Case 1995; 2003). In contrast, government
longevity can be measured via the length of time it sur-
vives in office before its removal. In these introductory
remarks we motivate our analysis with a fresh look
at the theoretical and empirical evidence relating gov-
ernment performance to longevity; we present some
descriptive data that suggest a reciprocal link between
these variables; and we highlight the existence of a dy-
namic relationship between government performance
and longevity, captured by popular aphorisms, such as
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those in our title, but so far not subject to detailed
theoretical analysis.
The relationship between longevity and perfor-
mance has been the subject of several studies, which
have revealed a positive association between these
variables. Indeed, even a casual inspection of the cross-
sectional relationship (we provide just such an illustra-
tion in Figure 1) suggests that longer lived governments
perform better. We motivate our analysis, however, by
first highlighting gaps in the literature.
The understanding of the link between longevity
and performance comes from studies of term-limited
executives. For example, Besley and Case (1995) high-
lighted the “lame duck” effects of term-limited U.S.
governors: Those who are unable to serve consecutive
terms have lower incentives, and thereby, the differ-
ence in time horizons of executives can have an impact
on their fiscal performance. The empirical evidence
comes from a cross-section of U.S. states: Between
1950 and 1987, taxes and spending were lower in states
where the governor could serve an additional term.1
Johnson and Crain (2004) extended that analysis of
fiscal expenditure and found similar results. Alt, Bueno
de Mesquita, and Rose (2011) showed that this re-
lationship holds when controlling for other tempo-
ral effects such as experience: Exploiting variation in
term limits across U.S. states—some states have two-
term limits, some have one-term limits, and some have
none—they found that, holding tenure constant, the
fiscal performance of term-limited politicians is worse
than that of their counterparts who could be reelected.2
Similarly Ferraz andFinan (2009) reported results from
an experiment in Brazil that show less corruption in
municipalities where themayor can be reelected, when
1 Besley and Case (2003) extended the sample to include years un-
til 1997. They found no effect of the term limit on taxation; only
spending is lower when the incumbent faces a binding term limit.
2 In contrast, Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose (2011) showed
that, holding term limits constant, those with longer tenure perform
better.
123
Dynamic Government Performance February 2012
FIGURE 1. Government Effectiveness versus Tenure
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Notes. Using data on 25 European democracies none of which have term limits, here we plot the World Bank Government Effectiveness
Index (averaged over the years from 1996 to 2008) on the average length of government tenure during this period. Countries that have
governments that survive longer on average also have more effective governments.
controlling for experience prior to election. Neverthe-
less, some researchers have found a negative associ-
ation between tenure and performance. For instance,
Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010) studied public pro-
curement in Italian municipalities and found that a
longer term in office is associatedwithworse outcomes:
fewer bidders per auction, a higher probability that the
winning firms are local, and lower revenues for the
municipality. They argued that these observations are
consistent with collusion between local politicians and
favored firms.
However, although several studies have considered a
performance–tenure link in the presence of term limits,
we know less about this relationship in the absence of
such constitutionally imposed constraints on length of
service. An exception is a paper by Bejar, Mukherjee,
and Moore (2011) who argued theoretically and em-
pirically that executives have incentives to increase
current spending (thereby passing a future burden to
their successors) and that this effect is magnified when
the government has a shorter expected tenure (see also
Spiller and Tommasi 2007). More generally, there are
problemswith drawingwider inferences from the term-
limit literature. We highlight three concerns.
First, in the absence of exogenous variation in term
length it is not clear, a priori, what relationship between
tenure and performance will be observed. The incen-
tives faced by politicians who know that their term will
end with certainty by a specific date are different from
those faced by politicians who could, in principle, serve
indefinitely. For example, a priori, longer time hori-
zons might induce better performance; equally, and as
pointed out byDick and Lott (1993), they could induce
shirking.
Second, most of the theoretical insights from the
term-limit literature refer to situations in which a
single-member executive—a governor in the United
States or a mayor in a Brazilian municipality—is sub-
ject to periodic evaluation. Beyond such cases, and
in particular in parliamentary forms of governance,
a multimember executive is collectively responsible.
This has an important effect not previously explored in
the literature. Collective responsibility means that an
executivemember’s tenure is only partly under his own
control. Although he may be ousted from office if his
performance falters, he can hold a ministerial position
only for as long as the government he serves survives.
Without a well-developed theory that takes account of
this collective aspect of parliamentary government, it is
not clear whether the theoretical insights of the term-
limit literature carry beyond a limited set of cases.
Third, and finally, in the absence of an exogenous
term limit, the tenure of executive member is en-
dogenous to her own performance and that of her
colleagues, and vice versa. Warwick (1992), for ex-
ample, used data from parliamentary democracies be-
tween 1950 and 1989 to show that economic variables,
which are plausibly under the executive’s control, af-
fect the government’s tenure. There is also empirical
evidence that performance measures do influence a
124
American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 1
government’s popularity and (presumably) its survival
prospects.Dewan andDowding (2005) showed a causal
relationship between the quarterly number of scandals
affecting governmentministers in theUnitedKingdom
and the government’s approval rating. Correcting for
possible endogeneity and measurement error by us-
ing an instrumental variable and controlling for fixed
government characteristics, they found that a scandal
causes a substantial fall in the government’s popularity.
Thus, the central point of relevance is that, in the ab-
sence of term limits, there are good reasons to believe
that the relationship between performance and tenure
is reciprocal.
The term-limit literature discussed earlier highlights
the cross-sectional relationship between tenure and
performance. However, subtle dynamics in the time
series of performance have not been extensively stud-
ied within the formal political science literature, and
yet time effects in government performance are com-
mon elements of political discourse: Governments are
deemed to enjoy “honeymoon” periods that may last
or be cut short; it is sometimes said that the “first one
hundred days” of government are its most productive;
conventional wisdom has it that “a week is a long time
in politics”; and governments are faced by “crises of
confidence” that can have long-term effects. Similarly,
in team sports, the notion that there are critical turning
points in a season, perhaps due to randomness in ref-
ereeing decisions or the arrival of debilitating injuries,
and that sometimes a string of good fortune or bad luck
can have a defining impact on a team’s fortunes, forms
part of the everyday lexicon of pundits. We might ask
whether such common truths can be related to hard ev-
idence; if so, then we might seek the underlying causes
of such observed patterns.
Even a cursory glance at the historical record sug-
gests some truth to the notion of honeymoon effects,
turning points, and crises of confidence that informs
everyday political discourse. There are numerous ex-
amples of governments that have gone from (appar-
ent) impregnability to imminent doom within a short
period of time. Between 1988 and 1993 the Canadian
Progressive Conservative Party not only lost its ma-
jority but also maintained only two seats by the 35th
Canadian Parliament. In Britain, the Macmillan gov-
ernment, elected in 1959 with a 100-plus majority, en-
joyed a 60%-plus approval rating in its early months,
but remarkably went on to lose half of its approval
rating and the 1964 election. John Major—UK premier
from 1992 to 1997—saw the popularity of his govern-
ment evaporate in his first two years of office: by 1995
the UK Conservative’s national approval rating fell to
its lowest ever recorded levels. A more recent example
concerns the travails of Fianna Fa´il which went from
being the dominant party in Irish politics during the
postwar era to having the status of a rump opposition
party.
Many factors contribute to such sudden reversals of
fortune. In the case of Prime Minister Harold Macmil-
lan, poor economic performance, divisions over Eu-
rope, and the challenge of a rejuvenated Labour party
under Harold Wilson all combined to weaken his posi-
tion. Historians widely regard the Profumo scandal—in
which Secretary of State for War John Profumo lied to
the House of Commons about his relationship with
Christine Keeler—as a critical point of no return for
Macmillan. The Daily Telegraph, traditionally strong
supporters of the Tories, effectively wrote the Macmil-
lan government’s epitaph onMarch 24, 1963, famously
stating that “it is distressing and mortifying that it
should end like this in scandal, weakness and mendac-
ity.” Similarly, the collapse in fortunes of John Major’s
Conservatives cameon thebackof local election results
that obliterated the party at the local level.
An important aspect of sudden changes in fortunes is
the effect that they have on perceptions of government
survival. Figure 2 illustrates this effect using prediction-
market data: the daily closing price for a contract on a
Labour victory in the last UK General Election. The
market’s guidelines suggest that “you can think of the
price at any time to be the percentage probability of
that event occurring.” There are, of course, several
contributory factors to the patterns in the data. Never-
theless, we note two distinct regimes: one starts from
when Prime Minister Blair announced his decision to
stand down, almost certainly to be replaced by Brown,
and ends 100 days into the Brown premiership. During
this period the slump in Labour’s fortunes was partially
reversed, and ministers could realistically expect that
they would remain in office during another Labour
term. After 100 days had elapsed the government’s
popularity waned and continued on a downward spiral
through May 2008 when, in a direct parallel to the
fortunes of the Major government, Brown suffered his
“Major moment” with the Labour party devastated by
local government losses.
These examples demonstrate that there are critical
turning points in a government’s fortunes and some
events from which a government will be unable to
recover. Indeed the notion of “critical events” in a
government’s duration has received some robust em-
pirical support in political science (Browne, Frendreis,
and Gleiber 1984).
Our observations here suggest a role for a new the-
oretical framework that, first, allows the exploration
of the interplay between performance and longevity
and, second, provides an understanding of the dynamic
nature of a government’s fortunes. In our model the
evolution of a government’s popularity is determined
by the performance choices of a ministerial team, and
the government survives in office only if it maintains
sufficient popularity. Ministers perform well if they
value their positions sufficiently, which happens when
the government is expected to last. In this environ-
ment there are multiple rational-expectations equilib-
ria: In one optimistic equilibrium ministers expect the
government to survive indefinitely and so their high
performance sustains this expectation; but there are
also pessimistic equilibria in which the government’s
expected demise becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
We extend our model to a world in which a gov-
ernment’s popularity is buffeted by unforeseen shocks;
such shocksmean that self-fulfilling pessimistic and op-
timistic expectations can be overcome by runs of good
125
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FIGURE 2. Prediction-market Confidence in the UK Government
Notes. These data from the intrade.com prediction market show the daily closing prices for a Labour victory in a UK General Election.
(A contract pays 100 points if the specified event occurs.)
and bad luck. As well as adding realism, our extended
model enables us to pin down a unique equilibrium.
In such an equilibrium, ministers perform well (and so
popularity rises in expectation) if and only if popularity
exceeds a critical threshold. Our predictions resonate
with some of the stylized examples we referred to
earlier. For instance, a sequence of bad news events
can push popularity below the critical threshold, after
which performance drops and the end of the govern-
ment becomes almost inevitable. Equally, however, a
government can enjoy a new lease of life or extended
honeymoon when a series of positive shocks pushes
popularity into an optimistic zone where ministerial
effort, fueled by expectations of longer tenure, sustains
the government in office.
In sum, we offer several insights. First, our analysis
shows that the positive relationship between an ex-
ecutive’s time horizons and performance travels be-
yond cases where term limits are constitutionally man-
dated. Second, we provide comparative-static insights
into the dynamic interplay between performance and
tenure. In particular, institutions that generate longer
time horizons can have a positive effect on perfor-
mance, which in turn bolsters a government’s survival
prospects. Third, our dynamic model illustrates thresh-
old effects: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid
collapse of performance is sparked when a sequence
of negative shocks pushes popularity below a unique
critical threshold.
In the next three sections of this article, we describe
our model of government longevity, performance, and
popularity; we characterize rational-expectations equi-
libria; and we offer a fuller characterization of equilib-
ria in a world where performance choice takes a simple
binary (high or low) form.We then extend our analysis
in three directions: We allow for shocks to a govern-
ment’s popularity and in so doing pin down a unique
equilibrium; we offer comparative-static predictions;
and we describe a variant of our model in which the
government is subject to periodic evaluation via fixed-
length electoral terms. We conclude by relating our
work to a wider selection of the existing literature.
A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND LONGEVITY
In our model, a governing executive comprises a unit
mass of ministers. At each moment in continuous
time an individual minister chooses his performance
e ∈ [eL, eH]. The simultaneous choices of ministers ag-
gregate to form the average performance et at time t,
which constitutes the executive’s overall performance.3
In this specification eachminister is individually neg-
ligible and so views the executive’s performance as
beyond his own control. This feature of our specifi-
cation simplifies our exposition, but it is not crucial to
our results nor to the key messages that flow from our
3 A little more formally, we can index the members of the executive
by i ∈ [0, 1] and write eit for the performance of minister i at time t.
Aggregate performance is then et =
∫ 1
0 eit di.
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analysis. Similar insights emerge (albeit less elegantly)
from a model within which an executive comprises a
finite team of ministers.
We think of a minister’s performance as the effort
devoted to his portfolio of tasks (for instance, the
government’s manifesto commitments) rather than to
private interests (which might include the develop-
ment of postministerial opportunities or even build-
ing a private support base within his party). Higher
performance is privately costly: The continuous-time
flow payoff u(e) enjoyed by the minister while serv-
ing in office is strictly decreasing in his performance.
Higher performance does, however, help a minister to
keep his jobs: He may be compelled to resign through
an individual error, scandal, or other personal failure
that is indicative of low performance. The hazard rate
λ(e) > 0 of such a forced resignation is decreasing in
his performance. Following his resignation, a sacked
minister receives a terminal payoff that we normalize
to zero.
A minister’s performance choice balances his flow
payoff andhis resignation risk. This choice is influenced
by a second aggregate-level risk to which a minister is
exposed: he may lose office together with other mem-
bers of the executive when the government is removed
from power. If this happens, then a minister receives a
terminal payoff of V† when the government dies. We
assume that the terminal payoff is not too large, so that
a minister does not actively wish his government to
fall.4
The government is sustained in office (shortly we
describe the circumstances under which its term ends)
by its popularity. We write xt ∈ [xL, xH] for the govern-
ment’s popularity at time t, where xH and xL are upper
and lower limits. This popularity variable has three fea-
tures: it rises and falls in response to a government’s
performance, it is buffeted by shocks and an unpopular
government is exposed to the risk of losing office.5 We
model the first two features by supposing that popular-
ity evolves via a stochastic differential equation:
dxt = r(et)dt + σ dzt. (1)
The flow change dxt comprises two components. The
first component, r(et)dt, is the nonrandom expected
per-period change in popularity. We assume that r(·) is
an increasing function, and so popularity reacts posi-
tively to performance. The second component, σ dzt, is
a random shock; it captures the buffeting of popularity
by chance events. Formally, dzt is the increment of a
standardWiener process: The government’s popularity
follows a Brownian motion with drift, where the drift
4 We assume that V‡ > V†, where V‡ ≡ max[eL,eH][u(e)/λ(e)]. This
assumption ensures that the career value of a minister declines as
the expected life of his government shortens.
5 We impose a single state variable for convenience and tractability.
If the government is formed ofmultiple political parties then it would
perhaps be more accurate to consider a world where, in addition to
observing the popularity of the government, ministers observe the
popularity of their own party.
reacts to the performance of the executive.6 If σ = 0
then (1) becomes the ordinary differential equation
dxt/dt = r(et); if random events are absent then each
minister can predict perfectly the government’s for-
tunes so long as he can anticipate the behavior of other
ministers.
Continuous-time stochastic processes are rarely used
in political science; a notable exception is recent work
by Callander (2011) in which he uses a Brownian-
motion-based model of policy making in complex en-
vironments, and in turn he acknowledges work by Car-
penter (2002; 2004). Given that such processes are used
rarely, we pause here to describe briefly amore familiar
(but less tractable) discrete-time version. Our specifi-
cation is the continuous-time analog of a discrete-time
process in which
xt+1 = xt + r(et)+ εt where εt ∼ N(0, σ2). (2)
Here r(et) is a step up (if performance is high) or step
down (if it is low) in fortunes, whereas εt reflects day-
to-day random events and the whims of public opinion.
We now specify the link between popularity and
longevity. An unpopular government is exposed to the
risk of losing office, and we model this in a simple
way. The upper bound to the range [xL, xH] is the max-
imum popularity that a government can enjoy. (For
instance, this may be a perfect approval rating.) The
lower bound, however, is the critical determinant of
survival: If popularity drops to xL then the government
falls and the careers of all ministers are terminated.
This is only one way of formulating the popularity–
longevity link; it is straightforward to build a similar
model (and with similar messages emerging) in which
the link arises from, for instance, a greater hazard of
government termination as the government’s popular-
ity falls.
Empirically, a government’s popularity may be re-
flected in its approval rating or some other measure of
popular confidence in the government, such as other
opinion poll results, the tone of media coverage, or
performance in midterm or other diagnostic elections.
A direct interpretation of our model is that there is a
critical level of popularity below which a government
may be subjected to a vote of confidence.
Our specification is designed to allow an exploration
of some general ideas in a relatively abstract frame-
work that enables us to analyze two core features of
the political process in liberal democracies: the col-
lective fate (or fortune) of government ministers; and
the dependence of the government’s fortunes on its
popularity. The underlying logic that a minister faces a
greater aggregate-level exposure to the risk of career
termination when the government is unpopular seems
sound. Yet our analysis does not correspond directly to
6 Formally, zt is a continuous-time stochastic process with the prop-
erty that different increments in the process are independently dis-
tributed, and where each increment is normally distributed with zero
mean and a variance equal to the difference in time between the start
and end of the increment.
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all empirical situations. For example,we consider a gov-
ernment comprised of several ministers but do not ex-
plicitly model how individual- or party-level character-
istics affect the value of a minister’s career. Neither do
we explicitly include other institutional features such
as fixed-term or periodic elections. However, it is rela-
tively straightforward to see that variants of our formal
model can be developed to apply to different situations
while incorporating the same core logic. To illustrate,
in a later section, we sketch our model with a fixed-
length electoral term (so that governments are subject
to periodic evaluation by voters). We show that similar
messages emerge and that the same general principles
apply. Later we also consider the robustness of our key
insights to variation in the type of government—single
or multiparty—that forms.
The abstract nature of our model also allows our
messages to apply to other time-varying measures of
the status of a governing executive, so long as those
measures share the three key features described ear-
lier. One example is the size of a government’s working
majority in a parliamentary system. Such a majority
may rise and fall in response to periodic by-elections.
The outcome of a by-election (and hence the size of
a governing party’s majority) may depend not only on
a government’s recent performance but also on un-
predictable contemporary events; finally, if a majority
is eroded then a government can be at risk of losing
power.
As another example we might also consider a sit-
uation (as in Dewan and Myatt 2010) whereby the
governing executive survives only while it has talent
to staff ministerial positions. In the Dewan and Myatt
(2010) model, the “talent pool” of potential ministerial
appointees shrinks as poor performance by ministers
generates forced resignations and the need for replace-
ments. Our popularity variable xt can be reinterpreted
in their context as the size of the talent pool.
In summary, popularity is a buffer stock of goodwill
that stands between a government and defeat; it is a
common-pool resource that is erodedby individual fail-
ures and scandals (when ministers perform badly) and
replenished by policy successes (when they perform
well) but that is also subject to unpredictable events
and opinion shocks. A feature of our model is that
popularity responds to team performance, and so the
stock of popularity is open to the commons exploita-
tion problems that are familiar throughout the social
sciences.7 The actions of ministers also have a strategic
effect on others, and these strategic effects are central
to much of our analysis.
7 Formally, eachminister in the executive team is infinitesimally small
and so it might seem that he has no appreciable effect on aggregate
performance, and so exerts no externalities on his colleagues. How-
ever, this is not quite true. The unit-mass-of-ministers specification
is the limit of a specification with n ministerial team members as
n → ∞. As n grows an individual minister’s effect on the aggregate
falls with 1/n. However, the number of others n− 1 affected by his
actions grows with n. Combining these two factors, externalities are
present even in the limit as n → ∞.
RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA
For the first step in our characterization of government
performance and popularity, we shut down one feature
of our model: We set σ = 0, so that shocks are absent
and so that the evolution of the government’s popular-
ity is nonrandom.
We seek rational-expectations equilibria. In such
an equilibrium, ministers form a common expectation
about the longevity of the administration, and each
minister optimally chooses his performance at each
point in time. Expectations are fulfilled if the induced
path of government popularity justifies the original ex-
pectation. Such an equilibrium is characterized by the
time T at which popularity reaches the critical level
xL. We allow for the case where T = ∞, so that the
government lives forever.
We first investigate how a minister’s optimal perfor-
mance choice responds to T. He balances the reduced
flow payoff from greater performance against the less-
ened risk of his forced resignation. The size of the latter
effect depends upon the value of his career to him; we
write Vt for this value at time t, and et for his per-
formance. His career value Vt satisfies the differential
equation
u(et)dt − λ(et)Vt dt + dVt = 0. (3)
This is an accounting identity. The first term u(et)dt
is the per-period flow payoff from holding office. The
second term λ(et)Vt dt is the flow expected loss from a
possible resignation event: Such an event arrives with
the hazard rate λ(et), and in the event of his forced
resignation the minister loses his career value Vt. The
final term is the expected gain or loss in career value
owing to the passage of time.
The performance et in (3) is chosen optimally by each
minister and so solves
et = argmax
e∈[eL,eH]
[u(e)− λ(e)Vt]. (4)
The properties of the flow payoff u(·) and the res-
ignation hazard λ(·) ensure that the optimally cho-
sen performance is increasing in the minister’s career
value.8
Equations (3) and (4), together with an appropriate
boundary condition, pin down a complete solution for
both et and Vt. The relevant boundary condition is that
the minister’s career value hits the terminal payoff V†
as the government’s term draws to a close. Formally,
VT = V† whenever T is finite; if a government is ex-
pected to live forever (that is, ifT = ∞) then insteadVt
is constant over time.We assume that all ministers face
the same loss on termination of theirministerial career.
This implies that all ministers have the same value of
holding office and have the same career prospects at
the time of the government’s termination. Perhaps the
closest fit to this assumption is that of a single-party
8 If there are multiple solutions to (4) then we set et equal to the
largest solution.
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FIGURE 3. Declining Ministerial Performance with a Quadratic Specification
Notes. This figure illustrates declining ministerial performance as the government’s end nears. We use a quadratic linear specification:
u(e) = u¯ − e22 and λ(e) = ¯λ − e where we assume that ¯λ >
√
2u¯. We set V† = 0. For this specification, et = Vt = ¯λ − ξ − 2ξ( ¯λ−ξ)e ξ(T−t)( ¯λ+ξ)−( ¯λ−ξ)
where ξ ≡
√
¯λ2 − 2u¯ and where the value of a career in an immortal government is V‡ = ¯λ − ξ.
government in whichministers face the same collective
fate: If the government loses a vote of confidence or is
voted out of office, all lose their positions. Neverthe-
less our analysis also extends to a multiparty coalition
where the expectation is that, should the government
be replaced, then no serving members of the existing
government will be included in the next government
that forms.9 When this is not the case, however, then
our results still hold, albeit with some wrinkles, as we
discuss later.
Turning to the details of this solution, we write V‡
for the optimized career value when the government
lives forever.10 We (naturally) assume that V‡ > V† so
that a minister prefers to be in a secure administration
than in a dying one. We write e‡ and e† for the per-
formance choices associated with V‡ and V†; naturally,
e‡ ≥ e†. Solving the minister’s career problem, career
value declines from a maximum of V‡, achieved as the
remaining lifetime T− t grows large, to a minimum
of V† as T− t vanishes. In tandem, performance de-
clines from a maximum of e‡ to a minimum of e†. To
keep things interesting, we consider situations in which
r(e‡) > 0 > r(e†).11
Lemma 1. If ministers believe that the government will
end at time T, then there is a unique length of time τ¯ such
that popularity increases if t < T− τ¯ but decreases if t >
T− τ¯.Therefore τ¯ is themaximumduration of declining
9 One example is the current situation in theUnited Kingdomwhere
the Liberal Democrats’ support for the coalition’s public spending
cuts makes it less likely that they will form a governing coalition with
the opposition (Labour) party in the future.
10 This “immortal government” career value isV‡ = max[eL,eH][u(e)/
λ(e)].
11 Technically, we require the optimal choice of performance to sat-
isfy r(e) > 0 for career values close enough toV‡ (but not necessarily
equal to it) and similarly r(e) < 0 for values close enough to V†.
popularity. A minister’s career value is decreasing over
time, and at an increasing rate: Vt is convex in t.
Figure 3 illustrates this lemma via a quadratic specifi-
cation for the relationship between a minister’s office-
holdingflowpayoff and resignationhazard rate. The ca-
reer value and performance decrease in tandem as the
anticipated end of government approaches. Notice that
the decline in the minister’s performance and career
value accelerates as the end of the government grows
near. This is consistent with evidence discussed in our
introductory remarks (Bejar, Mukherjee, and Moore
2011; Dal Bo´ and Rossi 2008; Spiller and Tommasi
2007). For instance, Dal Bo´ and Rossi (2008) analyzed
the performance of Argentinean senators whose term
lengths were randomly assigned. They found that sena-
tors who were allocated four-year terms outperformed
those allocated to two-year terms.
As discussed earlier time effects in government per-
formance are common elements of political discourse:
Governments are deemed to enjoy honeymoon peri-
ods that may last or be cut short, and it is sometimes
said that the first 100 days of government are its most
productive; the UK’s recent Brown administration il-
lustrates this (Figure 2). Yet there is little systematic
analysis of such time effects. Plausible performance-
related reasons for such effects include differences in
personnel (perhaps able ministers serve earlier) and
differences in the incentives that ministers face at dif-
ferent points in their term. The latter possibility was
explored by Dewan and Myatt (2010) who analyzed
a situation where an executive’s leader provides in-
centives by firing those who fail. Their analysis of the
hiring andfiring strategies usedby an executive’s leader
shows that, when the pool of ministerial talent is fi-
nite, the incentives to perform decline over the gov-
ernment’s tenure. Lemma 1 suggests that a decline in
performance can arise even in the absence of a change
in a minister’s incentive scheme; all that is required is
129
Dynamic Government Performance February 2012
a common perception that the government will end in
a finite period of time.12
Moving on from Lemma 1, we now consider the pos-
sible equilibrium values for T.
One rational-expectations equilibrium involves an
immortal government, so that T = ∞. Given the gov-
ernment’s expected immortality, ministers’ career val-
ues and performance choices will satisfy Vt = V‡ and
et = e‡ for all t. By assumption, r(e‡) > 0, and so popu-
larity will increase over time until it hits and remains at
its maximum level xH. From any starting point x0 > xL
this means that the government lasts forever, and so
ministers’ optimistic expectations are justified.
Other equilibria may involve the exhaustion of a
government’s popularity at some finite time T. The de-
cline in popularity occurs only during the government’s
low-performance era, which is limited: Lemma 1 says
that popularity falls only during the final τ¯ periods.
This imposes an upper bound to the feasible stock of
goodwill that can be eliminated. We write x¯ for this
maximum. This satisfies
x¯ = xL −
∫ T
T−τ¯
r(et)dt, (5)
where et is the aggregate performance choice associ-
ated with an end-of-government date T. Of course if
the government’s initial popularity is sufficiently high,
so that x0 > x¯, it cannot be fully depleted as part of
a rational-expectations equilibrium—in this case, the
unique rational-expectations equilibrium involves an
immortal government. In contrast, if initial popular-
ity is lower, so that x0 < x¯, then mortal-government
rational-expectations equilibria do arise.
There are two equilibria in which the government
term ends in finite time. One possibility is that T<
τ¯. Then, drawing on Lemma 1 once more–popularity
declines throughout the lifetime of the government.
The remaining possibility is thatT> τ¯. Then popularity
must first rise, peak at time t = T− τ¯, and then fall. To
satisfy the rational-expectations condition, popularity
must peak at x¯.13
We assemble the results emerging from this discus-
sion into a formal proposition.
Proposition 1. If the government’s initial popularity is
high, so that x0 > x¯, then there is a unique rational-
expectations equilibrium: The government is immortal,
so that T = ∞, and its popularity rises monotonically
to its maximum. If initial popularity is lower, so that
12 Our result holds if ministers have a common terminal career value
V†. This may not be so if there are ministers from multiple parties.
Suppose that a fraction γ > 0 of ministers expects that, if the gov-
ernment falls, they may be members of a replacement administra-
tion, and so have higher terminal career values, which always induce
higher performance. Lemma 1 still holds if γr(e‡)+ (1− γ)r(e†) < 0.
13 When T< τ¯ the value of T allows just enough time to eliminate
the initial stock; it satisfies x0 = xL −
∫ T
0 r(et)dt. It is straightforward
to confirm that this equation has a unique solution T ∈ (0, τ¯). When
T> τ¯ the length T− τ¯ of the high-performance regime must be just
enough for popularity to grow from its initial value to the peak;
formally, x¯ = x0 +
∫ T−τ¯
0 r(et)dt.
x0 < x¯, then in addition to the immortal-government
equilibrium there are twomortal-government equilibria:
In one, the government’s lifetime satisfies T< τ¯ and pop-
ularity declines monotonically; in the other, the lifetime
satisfies T> τ¯ and popularity rises to a maximum of x¯
at time t = T− τ¯ before beginning its decline.
Despite a large empirical literature that explores
government duration (we discuss some of this litera-
ture later), the insight that the length of a government
reflects the endogenous coordination of ministerial ex-
pectations that are filtered via performance is novel.
Our analysis of different equilibria describes a rela-
tionship between popularity at the time of a govern-
ment’s formation and its duration. For the first case
(x0 > x¯) a government that enters office on a wave
of popular support is buoyed by confidence. Minis-
ters are sufficiently assured of their tenure that they
value their careers highly, and so they deliver the high
performance that sustains an everlasting honeymoon.
Turning to the second case (x0 < x¯), if the government
takes office in an atmosphere of caution then it is less
secure. Executive members know that the government
will last only if their colleagues expect it to.Whether or
not the government falls in finite time depends on the
coordinationofministers’ expectations. In one scenario
starting from x0, as confidence grows, so that support
passes through x¯, high expectations once again sustain
a good equilibrium in which the government lasts in-
definitely. Yet there are two other equilibria in which
the government fails in finite time. These are illustrated
in Figure 4.
Our insight that an equilibrium exists in which
high performance, popular support, and government
longevity can be mutually reinforcing provides fresh
insights to the effects of executive turnover. An unre-
solved puzzle is that, despite differences between the
economic performance of democracies and autocra-
cies, there is little evidence for a (positive) relation-
ship between executive turnover and economic growth.
One argument, suggested by Barro (1996), is that this
lack of evidence reflects distributional concerns that
arise when governments are frequently voted out of
office. However, case study evidence suggests that such
distributional concerns are no less apparent in coun-
tries with long periods of single-party dominance. Cox
and Thies (2000), for example, argued that the effects
of the single nontransferable vote in Japan meant that
“same-party candidates were often engaged in bitter
blood feuds for the support of the same pool of voters”
(40). Our model, in line with the micro-level study of
Dal Bo´ and Rossi (2008) cited earlier, suggests that
time horizons associated with the frequency of exec-
utive turnover might be a contributing factor. Indeed
we provide a possible explanation for the durability
of dominant-party governments such as that of the
Liberal Democrats in Japan. In contrast to authoritar-
ian single-party regimes, these governments could have
fallen because of voter discontent. In fact they stayed
in power, boosted by popular support and relatively
strong fiscal performance for much of the postwar
era.
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FIGURE 4. Equilibrium Paths for Popularity
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Notes. This figure illustrates equilibrium paths for evolving popularity using the linear quadratic specification from Figure 3. The parameter
choices are ¯λ = 1, u¯ = 1.5, and we specify r(e) = e− 0.8. There are three equilibria, with three different lengths for the duration of the
government. In the “good” equilibrium, optimism supports an immortal government (a terminal date of TH = ∞); popularity follows the
solid line, rising until it hits the ceiling xH . In the “bad” equilibrium, pessimism corresponds to a short horizon TL ; popularity follows the
dashed line, falling monotonically. Finally, there is a non-monotonic equilibrium (the remaining broken line) in which the government
lives until time TM . Popularity increases initially (but more slowly than in the optimistic equilibrium) until it reaches a maximum of x¯, and
then it declines for the remaining τ¯ periods of the government’s life.
Beyond this insight our model is unable to draw a
clear relation between government performance, pop-
ularity, and survival in office. In particular, when initial
popularity falls below the safe and secure level of x¯ then
we are unable to pin downaunique path of government
performance: There are equilibria in which the govern-
ment support either rises or falls monotonically from
its initial level, and another in which it first increases
before decreasing. Which (if any) of the self-fulfilling
prophecies will be fulfilled?
As illustrated in Figure 4 one of our equilibria is
non-monotonic. Popularity first rises and then falls.
However, the fundamental situation faced bymembers
of the executive is fully captured by the government’s
popularity. If behavior depends only on fundamentals,
then ministers must respond in the same way given
any particular popularity level; that is, conditioning on
fundamentals only involves Markovian equilibria. In
contrast to the two (monotonic) equilibria, the non-
monotonic equilibrium is non-Markovian: For each
x ∈ (x0, x¯) there are two different points in time (one
before t = T− τ¯ and one after) at which ministers
choose different performance levels.
The non-monotonic and non-Markovian equilib-
rium has some interesting properties, but neverthe-
less we argue (and demonstrate later) that it does not
represent a robust and sensible solution. One such in-
teresting property is an unnatural (and so intriguing,
of course) comparative-static prediction: In the con-
text of the non-Markovian equilibrium, an increase in
initial popularity shortens, rather than lengthens, the
lifetime of the government. This is because an increase
in x0 reduces the length of time needed before pop-
ularity reaches its maximum of x¯ at time t = T− τ¯. It
is tempting to focus on this counterintuitive property.
However, we do not do so and note that others (Rowat
and Dutta 2011) have also resisted the temptation
to focus analysis on such equilibria with topsy-turvy
properties.
Back-to-front comparative-static properties also
emerge in related games. Consider a textbook 2× 2
coordination game in which players receive positive
payoffs only if they choose the same action, but where
one coordinated action profile is better than the other.
Naturally, there are two pure-strategy equilibria; but
there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
the “good” action is played with lower probability
than the “bad” action, and this probability (coun-
terintuitively, perhaps) falls as the payoff from the
good (pure strategy) equilibrium grows.14 However,
the mixed equilibrium is nonrobust under a variety of
equilibrium-selection criteria (for instance, risk dom-
inance selects one of the pure equilibria) or reason-
able strategy-revision processes (such a process moves
away from themixed equilibrium). Thenon-monotonic
rational-expectations equilibrium in our model is anal-
ogous to this mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, our non-monotonic equilibrium is not robust
to shocks to the government’s popularity as we show
later. Foreshadowing this, consider what happens at
time t = T− τ¯, when popularity satisfies xt = x¯. The
equilibrium calls for ministers to adopt pessimistic ex-
pectations. However, even a tiny boost to popularity
would shift the executive into a regime satisfying xt > x¯,
where the unique equilibrium involves immortality.
Relatedly, a slight suspicion that this might happen
would be enough to push performance up and so justify
the suspicion.
14 Formally, consider a 2× 2 game in which players receive H each
if they both choose the good action, L each if they both choose
the bad action, and zero otherwise, where H> L > 0. The mixed
equilibrium involves both players choosing the good action with
probability L/(L+H).
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With these concerns inmind, we proceed by focusing
on theMarkovian equilibria in whichministers’ perfor-
mance choices, career values, and the executive’s re-
maining lifetime all depend solely on the government’s
current popularity; we write e(x), V(x), and τ(x) for
these three endogenous variables, written as a func-
tion of current popularity x. (Later we offer a formal
justification for our focus on Markovian equilibria.)
Proposition 2. For each x∗ ∈ [xL, x¯] there is a Marko-
vian equilibrium in which x∗ acts as a critical popu-
larity threshold. Beginning from above the threshold
(x > x∗) performance is maximized, popularity rises to
its maximum level, and the government lives forever.
Beginning from below the threshold (x < x∗), however,
popularity and performance both decline over time until
the government falls in finite time.
The properties of equilibria described in Proposi-
tion 2 are natural: A commonly understood barrier
separates worlds of optimism (xt > x∗) and pessimism
(xt < x∗). The effect is that the equilibria of our model
reflect a reciprocal relationship between government
survival and performance, consistent with empirical
patterns discussed in our introductory remarks, that
works via the rational expectations of governmentmin-
isters. However, this version of our model, with σ = 0,
has shortcomings. There remain many equilibria: The
barrier between optimism and pessimism is not (yet)
uniquely defined. This means that we are unable to
provide a direct link between the level of government
performance and longevity; the same level of perfor-
mancemight lead to quite different predictions accord-
ing to the equilibrium threshold adopted, therefore, we
are unable yet to offer clear comparative-static predic-
tions. Moreover, our aim is to develop a theoretical
framework that accounts for the dynamic nature of
a government’s fortunes that might reflect a switch in
expectations from optimism to pessimism.Referring to
our earlier example illustrated by Figure 2, our analysis
suggests that a switch in expectations from optimistic
to pessimistic occurred at around the time when 100
days had elapsed from the time of the inauguration of
Brown’s government. Before addressing these issues
we develop an illustrative example.
AN EXAMPLE:
HIGH AND LOW PERFORMANCE
Our mathematical model offers insights into perfor-
mance that are related to aspects of political life. Min-
isters in a government face a collective fate—if the
government falls they all lose their jobs, at least tem-
porarily. Moreover, although ministers enjoy the re-
wards of office these rewards are unadjusted at the
margin to compensate for an individual minister’s ef-
fort; to our knowledge no governing executive offers
performance-related pay. These features combine in
our model to reveal a stark contrast between the per-
formance of a government whose survival prospects
are optimistic and that of an executive for which ex-
pectations of survival are pessimistic.
We develop this analysis using a specification in
which there is a binary choice between high (e = eH)
and low (e = eL) performance.15 One interpretation
of our binary-action world is where a minister either
chooses to put all of his effort into pushing the gov-
ernment’s policies, or none. We also use this specifica-
tion in the next section, when we allow for shocks to
popularity. In essence, this binary-choice specification
reflects a participation choice for an executive mem-
ber. Relatedly, in companion work in progress (Dewan
and Myatt 2011) we consider a world in which higher
quality ministers are willing to serve in a government
only if its life is sufficiently long.
It is helpful to simplify notation, and so we write
uH ≡ u(eH) and uL ≡ u(eL) for the flow payoffs from
high and low performance, respectively, and similarly
we write λH ≡ λ(eH), λL ≡ λ(eL), rH ≡ r(eH), and rL ≡
r(eL). The various parameter restrictions on the model
then boil down to uL > uH > 0, λL > λH > 0, and rH >
0 > rL.
The parameter ranges in which the model can say
something interesting are those where a minister’s per-
formance is responsive to theperceived longevity of the
government: high performance when the government
is immortal and lowperformancewhen it is near its end.
When the government’s tenure is secure, high perfor-
mance generates an expected payoff ofuH/λH, whereas
the low-performance payoff is uL/λL. So we restrict to
the case where uH/λH > uL/λL. (If this inequality fails,
then aminister would never choose high performance.)
More generally, the optimality condition (4) generates
high rather than low performance if and only if
uH − λHVt ≥ uL − λLVt
⇔ Vt ≥ V∗ where V∗ ≡ uL − uH
λL − λH . (6)
V∗ is easily interpreted. The numerator is the flow cost
of choosing higher performance; the denominator is
the effect on the hazard rate of ministerial resignation.
The ratio of these terms is the effective cost of reducing
resignation risk: Only when his career value exceeds
this does the minister find it worthwhile to perform
well. To ensure that e† = eL we simply check that a
minister’s terminal payoff in a failed government is
low enough; this is the simple inequality V† < V∗.
A government can remain in office despite poor per-
formance so long as it sustains a sufficiently large stock
of popular goodwill. An implication is that periods of
poor performance sustained by negative expectations
may be prolonged. For example, the Brown govern-
ment limped to electoral defeat in 2011 despite amonth
by month decrease in opinion polls and amidst consis-
tent concerns about its performance. We have noted
in the past that the empirical work of researchers who
15 Technically, a restriction of the action space does not fit within our
model’s specification. Nevertheless, a binary-action model is eas-
ily accommodated by considering a specification in which both the
payoff function u(·) and the resignation hazard rate λ(·) are linear
in performance; this ensures that a minister’s optimal performance
choice is at an extreme of the interval [eL, eH].
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focus on the length of time that a government survives
is related to a concern for government stability that
may be misguided; it is perhaps better to focus on the
time during which a government performs well (De-
wan and Myatt 2010). Lemma 1 revealed a maximum
length of time τ¯ toward the end of a government’s time
in office where popularity is declining. Here we can
calculate explicitly the (maximum) length of this low-
performance era.
In this high-or-low world, this era corresponds to
times where a minister’s career value satisfies the in-
equality Vt < V∗. To check when this inequality holds,
we solve explicitly the differential equation (3) while
imposing the boundary condition VT = V†. During the
twilight of a government’s life (when t > T− τ¯, so that
et = eL) the solution is straightforwardly obtained:
Vt = uL
λL
− exp[−λL(T− t)]
(
uL
λL
− V†
)
. (7)
Thefirst termon the right-hand side is the valueof hold-
ing a position in an immortal governmentwhile deliver-
ing lowperformance. The second termexp[−λL(T− t)]
is the probability that the minister survives until the
end of the government’s lifetime. If this happens, then
the low-performance career value is swapped for the
terminal payoff V†; this generates the third and final
term.
The solution for Vt in (7) has the properties we ex-
pect: The value of a minister’s career is decreasing in t
or, equivalently, increasing in the perceived remaining
lifetime T− t. So, moving back through time, Vt grows
until eventually it reaches the critical value V∗.16 Thus,
setting t = T− τ¯ and Vt = V∗ yields a unique solution
for τ¯, which is reported in Proposition 3. This also de-
termines the size of the maximum buffer of popularity
that canbe eliminatedduring the government’s decline.
Proposition 3. For the binary-action specification
(where eachminister chooses between high and low per-
formance) the maximum length of the low-performance
era is
τ¯ = 1
λL
log
[
(uL − λLV†)(λL − λH)
λLuH − λHuL
]
. (8)
The popularity that can be depleted in this time is x¯ =
xL + |rL|τ¯.
Recall that x¯ is a critical popularity level: If the gov-
ernment is more popular than this (x0 > x¯) then there
is a unique equilibrium in which the government is
immortal.
Some comparative-static predictions that emerge are
very natural. Both x¯ and τ¯ are decreasing in uH: Making
high performance more attractive shortens the period
16 Allowing T− t → ∞ the solution for Vt converges to uL/λL.
Straightforward calculations confirm that uH/λH > uL/λL implies
that uL/λL > V∗. Hence, if T− t is sufficiently large then Vt exceeds
V∗.
of declining popularity and so lowers the bar to the
unique-immortal-equilibrium regime. Note also that
x¯ and τ¯ are both increasing in uL, so that a greater
payoff from low-performance lengthens the declining
popularity era. However, this is perhaps misleading,
because increasing uL while uH is fixed mixes together
two effects: It makes it more costly to supply high
performance, thereby encouraging lower performance,
but at the same time it increases the valueof aminister’s
career, which encourages high performance. To isolate
these two effects, it useful to rewrite τ¯ as
τ¯ = 1
λL
log
[
(uL/λL)− V†
(uL/λL)− V∗
]
where V∗ = uL − uH
λL − λH .
(9)
Fixing the cost uL − uH and effect λL − λH of height-
ened performance, τ¯ and x¯ are decreasing in uL. This
works through an income effect: Making his career
more valuable encourages a minister to work harder
to retain his job. The impact of such income effects on
politician’s incentives has been noted by Besley (2004),
and our analysis confirms the robustness of those
findings.
A further comparative-static result is that τ¯ and x¯
both fall as the terminal payoff V† grows. Thus, en-
hancing the value of a survivingminister (perhaps even
via the receipt of a “golden handshake” conditional on
serving a full term) works in favor of increased perfor-
mance. This might appear counterintuitive: Increasing
postcareer earnings should make maintaining a gov-
ernment career (relatively) less valuable and make
ministers more willing to switch. However, the overall
benefit of a minister’s career, relative to being fired
from his position (rather than relative to his career
as an ex-minister untainted by scandal) rises, and so
the income effect induces higher performance.17 The
gain in performance may even offset the more obvious
costs stemming from a conflict of interest that arise
when allowing executive members to accept lucrative
postministerial positions. In theUnited Kingdom, min-
isters must consult the committee for Standards in
Public Life if they accept private sector posts within
two years of leaving the government. There has been
media pressure to restrict postministerial career earn-
ings; however, our analysis suggests that there may be
countervailing implications from such a move.
This discussion refers to the general set of equilib-
ria. However, we may also straightforwardly extend
Proposition 3 to the case of Markovian equilibria. For
theMarkovian case, the performance choice and career
value of a minister depend on the current popularity of
the government rather than on calendar time.
17 An interesting effect is that the increased value of a political career
that comes with company directorships, as noted for the data on UK
MPs by Eggers andHainmueller (2009), may postpone the fall of the
government and thus the taking up of such offers.
133
Dynamic Government Performance February 2012
FIGURE 5. Markov Value Functions and the Popularity Threshold
Notes. This is value function V(x) for a Markovian equilibrium in a binary-action world. The lower bound for popularity is xL = 0; the
terminal payoff for a minister is V† = 0. The other parameter choices are uL = 7, λL = 2, and rL = −1 for the low-performance regime;
and uH = 4, λH = 1, and rH = 1 for the high-performance regime. Given that V† = 0, for the “pessimistic” regime where x < x∗, the
value function (the solid line in the figure) satisfies
V(x) = uL
λL
(
1 − exp
[
−λL x|rL |
])
.
This function hits V∗ at a popularity level of x¯, which in this case satisfies x¯ = log(7)/2; there is a Markovian equilibrium for any x∗ below
this.
Corollary (to Proposition 3). For any threshold x∗ ∈
[0, x¯], where x¯ is obtained from Proposition 3, there is
a Markovian equilibrium. Performance satisfies e(x) =
eH for x > x∗ and e(x) = eL for x < x∗. For x < x∗ (so
the government is mortal),
V(x) = uL
λL
− exp
[
−λL(x− xL)|rL|
](
uL
λL
− V†
)
, (10)
but otherwise, for x > x∗, a minister’s career value is
V(x) = V‡ = uH/λH.
A value function solution that emerges from this
corollary is illustrated in Figure 5.
RANDOM SHOCKS AND
CRISES OF CONFIDENCE
Thus far we have considered a world in which a gov-
ernment’s popularity evolves deterministically as a re-
sult of ministers’ action choices, and ministers can
anticipate how their careers will progress. A missing
ingredient is the element of uncertainty about a gov-
ernment’s popularity and survival prospects. Ministers
in the United Kingdom’s recent Brown administration
would of course have reacted with caution to the good
news of an early bounce in the opinion polls and gov-
ernment fortunes beginning May 10, 2007. In calcu-
lating his career value he would have anticipated that
what goes up can come back down, and not always di-
rectly as a result of ministers’ actions. In the remainder
of the article we consider a more realistic world where
uncertainty is present and its presence is understood
when ministers choose their actions. We continue with
the sharper binary-action specification of the previous
section, andwe consider (as in theCorollary toProposi-
tion 3) aMarkovian equilibrium with a threshold of x∗.
Here we discuss what happens when popularity equals
that threshold.
Suppose that a minister sees that xt = x∗, so that
the popularity of the government is on a knife’s edge
between “good” (long-term survival) and “bad” (in-
evitable decline) worlds, but anticipates a possible
shock to the government’s popularity. For instance, we
can imagine a situation in which the latest macroeco-
nomic statistics (inflation, unemployment, and so on)
are about to be announced; such an announcement
might contain either good or bad news for a govern-
ment’s popularity. At this point in time a positive shock
(for instance, a drop in unemployment) can allow the
government to escapeup into the good regime, inwhich
case the minister’s career is worthV‡; however, a nega-
tive shock (for instance, higher than expected inflation)
can push the government’s popularity down into the
bad regime, in which case ministers career is worth
V(x∗), where the formula for V(x) is from (10). For
the purposes of an informal discussion, suppose that
these two shocks are equally likely. If this is so, then
the minister’s expected career value is (V‡ + V(x∗))/2,
which is the simple average of the “good news” and
“bad news” possibilities. Now, x∗ is the critical popular-
ity threshold at which the minister’s behavior switches
from low performance to high performance. Thus, at
the threshold a minister should be indifferent between
these choices. This is so if and only if his career is worth
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precisely V∗ to him. That is,
V∗ = V
‡ + V(x∗)
2
⇔
x∗ = xL + |rL|
λL
log
[
(uL/λL)− V†
(uH/λH)+ (uL/λL)− 2V∗
]
,
(11)
where the solution for x∗ is obtained after using the
formula for V(x∗) from (10). Thus the threshold lies at
the point where the career valuation V∗ that prompts
higher performance lies halfway between the career
values in the optimistic and pessimistic regimes.18
The threshold x∗ illustrated in Figure 5 satisfies this
property.19
To make this argument rigorous, we revert to a
model in which the evolution of popularity is explic-
itly subject to random events. Setting σ > 0, evolving
popularity satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dxt = r(et)dt + σ dzt. Whereas the drift of popularity
(upor down) is determined (via r(et)) by the executive’s
performance, theBrownianmotion termdztmeans that
unforeseen shocks, policy disasters, and the whims of
public opinion can destabilize even the best performing
executive; similarly, good luck may help rescue an oth-
erwise doomed administration. We surmise that many
governments have been subject to shocks not under
their control and that this affects the calculations made
by members of the executive about the value of their
careers. There is evidence that the public’s evaluations
do indeed depend on random events—droughts, floods,
and (even) shark attacks—that occur during their pe-
riod of tenure (Achen and Bartels 2004) and that eco-
nomic shifts that are plausibly unrelated to an incum-
bent’s performance are nevertheless related to their
career prospects (Wolfers 2007). Our rational expecta-
tions model thus seeks to incorporate these factors: A
politician anticipates the effect that shocks might have
on the government’s popularity and so his career value,
when choosing his performance.
18 The logic here is related to arguments from the “global games”
literature in economics (Carlsson and van Damme 1993; Morris and
Shin 1998, for instance). In a typical global game, players of a co-
ordination game receive private signals of a payoff-relevant state of
the world. In equilibrium, a player takes one action rather than its
alternative if and only if a signal exceeds a threshold. Such mod-
els are game-theoretic, they are static, and they involve uncertainty
about the state of the world. In contrast, the model in this article is
(essentially) a competitive one, it is dynamic, and the current state of
the world (popularity) is known. Surveys of the early global games
literature have beenprovidedbyMyatt, Shin, andWallace (2002) and
(more notably) by Morris and Shin (2003). Applications of related
techniques have only recently been seen in political science (Dewan
and Myatt 2007a; Myatt 2007), although an earlier application to
strategic voting was described by Fisher and Myatt (2002).
19 The solution for x∗ given in (11)makes sense only if x∗ > xL. If the
formula yields x∗ < xL then insteadwe expect a threshold of x∗ = xL,
and so optimism is inevitable. Thus, for a collapse in confidence to be
part of our chosen Markovian equilibrium then, following a further
inspection of (11), the terminal career payoff V† needs to be low
enough; for V† = 0, we need (uH/λH) > 2V∗.
As before, a minister faces uncertainty because poor
individual performancemay lead to his own premature
demise; this is reflected in the performance-dependent
hazard rate λ(e). But now he is also uncertain about his
government’s longevity. This uncertainty stems from
the random shock σ dzt which can push against the
established drift of popularity. Even when the govern-
ment’s popularity falls far below the threshold x∗, it re-
mains possible that a lucky streak of positive outcomes
could lift popularity above the threshold; a minister in
a declining government should recognize this possibil-
ity. Similarly, a high-performing government enjoying
maximum goodwill can always suffer a run of bad luck.
In the absence of random events, a single commonly
understood barrier separates the worlds of optimism
(xt > x∗) from those of pessimism (xt < x∗); when ran-
dom events are present then these two worlds may
collide.
Turning to our formal analysis, we consider Marko-
vian equilibria in which a minister’s career value V(x)
and performance choice e(x) both depend solely on
the government’s current popularity. (We will subse-
quently confirm that there are no non-Markovian equi-
libria.) As before, performance is determined by the
minister’s desire to keep his job, and so satisfies the
optimality condition e(x) = argmax[u(e)− λ(e)V(x)]
from (24). The extra step needed for the analysis of
a world with random shocks is a careful consideration
of a minister’s evolving career valuation V(x).
As before, V(x) is increasing in x. However, in con-
trast to the earlier nonrandom world, V(x) is smoothly
and strictly increasing in x; the discontinuity that ap-
pears in Figure 5 cannot be present when σ > 0, and
there cannot be a range of popularities where V(x) is
constant. To seewhy, note that in the nonrandomworld
V(x) is constant only when V(x) = V‡ for x > x∗; that
is, when the government is immortal. Once random
events are present, however, there is always a posi-
tive probability that a run of bad luck results in the
government’s defeat. Thus V(x) < V‡ for all x, and re-
calling the arguments used previously we can establish
that career values must be strictly enhanced by greater
popularity. The presence of uncertainty also rules out
any discontinuities; the ebb and flow of random events
smooth out the transition across any possible disconti-
nuity. Thus, a sharp step up in a minister’s career at an
arbitrary threshold, as in Figure 5, cannot occur.
We now describe the differential equation that cap-
tures the link between popularity and the value of a
minister’s career. As before, simple accounting ensures
that
udt − λVdt + E[dV] = 0, (12)
where it is understood that u and λ both depend on a
minister’s performance choice, and so on the current
state of popularity via the perceived career value V(x).
The first and second terms are as before; they represent
the flow payoff from holding office and the expected
loss fromapremature forced resignation. The third and
final term is the expected change in a minister’s career
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value owing to the passage of time. When popular-
ity evolves predictably then this is constant. However,
herewe need to take expectations into account because
theminister’s career value canbe influencedby random
events. Adopting a second-order Taylor expansion and
taking expectations (in more formal terms, this is the
deployment of Itoˆ’s Lemma) we obtain
E[dV] = V′(x)r dt + σ
2V′′(x)
2
dt, (13)
where it is understood that r depends on aggregate
performance and so, viaV(x), on the current popularity
enjoyed by the government.20 Bringing together (12)
and (13), the value equation, on the one hand, with
that describing the evolution of the career value as
popularity ebbs and flows on the other, we obtain
u− λV(x)+ rV′(x)+ σ
2V′′(x)
2
= 0. (14)
Solving for a Markovian equilibrium boils down to
solving for the right solution of this differential equa-
tion. Of course, such a second-order differential equa-
tion typically has a family of solutions, and so we need
to look for two boundary conditions to pin down a
unique value function, and so a unique equilibrium.
To obtain the necessary conditions, we consider the
value function at its boundaries. The first condition is
that VL(0) = V†: Ministers who serve out their term
obtain a “golden handshake” worth V† when the gov-
ernment dies with them in post. We condition used this
to characterize the solution forV(x) for x < x∗ whenwe
analyzed a world without random shocks. Here, how-
ever, this boundary condition is not enough, because of
the second-order term in the differential equation (14).
The second conditionwe need is obtained by looking at
what happens when popularity reaches its maximum at
xH. The condition we need isV′(xH) = 0. This “smooth
pasting” condition says that as popularity approaches
its upper bound xH it asymptotes; heuristically, this
prevents a minister from expecting his career value
to crash through its upper bound and so ensures that
V(xt) faces a ceiling at V(xH).
With all of the ingredients in place, we are in a
position to characterize fully the (unique) Markovian
equilibrium.Herewe restrict our attention to offering a
full solution in a binary-action world. However, the ap-
proach we have taken here applies to a wider range of
circumstances. With a binary specification (either high
or low performance) a threshold x separates (much as
before) the optimistic high-performance honeymoon
20 To understand (13), consider a small step in time t associated
with a change in career value V and a change in popularity x.
Taking a second-order expansion, V ≈ V′(x)x+ V′′(x)(x)2/2.
Treating r as a constant,x ∼ N(rt, σ2), and so E[x] = rt and
E[(x)2] = (rt)2 + σ2t. Hence,
E[V]
t
= V′(x)r+ V
′′(x)[r2t + σ2]
2
.
Allowing t to vanish, (13) emerges readily.
world from the pessimistic low-performance waning
popularity world. Within each of the two segments
of the value function (that is, either side of x) the
parameters u, λ, and r that are present in the differen-
tial equation (14) are all constant. When this is so, the
equation is linear and so easy to solve. In theAppendix
we derive separate solutions and stitch them together
at the transition threshold x.21
Proposition 4. Consider a binary-action world in which
σ > 0. Define:
x∗ ≡ xL + |rL|
λL
log
|rL|[UL − V†]
rH[UH − V∗]+ |rL|[UL − V∗]
(15)
where UL ≡ uL/λL, where UH ≡ uH/λH, and where
V∗ ≡ (uL − uH)/(λL − λH).
If xH > x∗ > xL and if σ2 is sufficiently small, then
there is a unique Markovian equilibrium in which min-
isters choose high performance if and only if popu-
larity exceeds a unique critical threshold x satisfying
xH > x > xL and where limσ2→0 x = x∗.
When x∗ falls outside the stated range, thenministers
are either unflinchingly optimistic (high performance
for all x if x∗ < xL) or never have sufficient popularity to
perform highly (if x∗ > xH). When xH > x∗ > xL then
we have a unique equilibrium in which performance is
high when popularity is above the threshold, and low
when it falls below the threshold. When rL = −rH then
the solution for x∗ given in (15) is precisely that given
by (11), which followed our earlier heuristic argument.
The unique Markovian equilibrium described thus
provides a framework that relates performance, pop-
ularity, and a government’s longevity. The properties
of this equilibria are similar to those described ear-
lier in Proposition 2: A commonly understood barrier
separates worlds of optimism (xt > x∗) and pessimism
(xt < x∗). However now we have uniquely defined the
barrier between optimism and pessimism and so can
provide a one-for-one link between the level of a gov-
ernment’s performance and its longevity. The predic-
tions of the model do not depend on the equilibrium
analyzed.
THE DYNAMICS OF POPULARITY
AND PERFORMANCE
Adding noise to ourmodel not only pins down a unique
equilibrium but this dose of realism also allows us to
21 We find solutions VL(x) for x < x and VH(x) for x > x, where
these solutions satisfy the boundary conditions. We then ensure that
these solutions flow smoothly together at the critical threshold x.
Thus we need VL(x) = VH(x) = V∗ (so that two segments of the
value function meet at the point where performance changes from
low to high) and V′L(x
) = V′H(x) (so that the two segments paste
smoothly together). The proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix
provides further details.
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address empirical puzzles so far unexplained in the lit-
erature.With noise in its level of popularity the govern-
ment is subject to the whims of public opinion that are
not directly related to its performance.Recent research
has shown that the reelection of executives depends on
circumstances that are beyond their control. Wolfers
(2007) analyzed whether voters respond to variation in
state economic outcomes that reflect clearly exogenous
and easily observed shocks. He found that although
voters are able to distinguish local performance from
national trends, the reelection rates of U.S. governors
are systematically related to national changes in oil
prices. This can be seen as evidence of superficial ir-
rationality on behalf of the electorate (see also Achen
and Bartels 2004).
By incorporating these behavioral features—via the
noise term in the evolution of government popularity—
our rational expectations model provides a channel
from these random shocks to the survival of the ex-
ecutive that can plausibly explain patterns in the data.
Suppose that the government is indeed punished for
events beyond its control so that a random shock can
cause the government’s popularity to fall. Moreover
suppose that the shock (or perhaps a series of shocks)
is sufficient to shift perceptions of ministers into the
pessimistic waning popularity region that in turn in-
duces low performance. As we have seen, the switch
in the expectations of ministers is reinforced by poor
performance. This, in turn, increases the likelihood the
government will fall. In conclusion, although exoge-
nous shocks such as oil price hikes cannot rationally
be attributed to incumbent performance, they can (in a
rational expectations framework) affect performance
in away that hastens the government’s demise.Wenote
that (some portion of) the estimate of the effects of oil
shocks (or flu epidemics, shark attacks, and the like)
might be due to variation in performance that results
from such shocks.22
Although our model is abstract and builds on prim-
itive political forces, namely the rise and fall of a
government’s popularity, it nevertheless can shed new
light on several cases; in particular, those where gov-
ernments have experienced sharp and sudden crises
of confidence. Many governments have been affected
by shocks that are unpredicted or implausibly related
to their performance in office, before becoming em-
broiled in scandal and subject to terminal decline.
British history offers a very pertinent case of LordRus-
sell’sWhig government that took office during the Irish
famine. The devastating effects of this natural disaster
were worsened by the lack of action taken by ministers
in the Russell government.
More recent cases include governments that have
fallen as a result of the financial crisis in 2008. The
remarkable fall of Ireland’s Fianna Fa´il, the dominant
party in government for much of its 85-year history, is
perhaps most illustrative. Support for the Fianna Fa´il
government had proved resilient through almost all
22 Intriguingly, it is possible that the mere perception that the public
might respond negatively to such events could trigger poor perfor-
mance that is related to a drop in support.
of the postwar era. In early 2008 its popularity rating
stoodat a highof 63%. Inour parlance this high support
operated as a “buffer” that insulated the government
against shocks to its popularity. Indeed, this proved
to be so. The Fianna Fa´il government was affected by
several shocks—scandals throughout 2007 and 2008—
but its support remained resilient and itsmajority in the
Dail unquestioned. The financial crisis that began in
2008 eventually changed this picture, first denting sup-
port before it plummeted. This pattern is reflective of
the effects of an unpopular austerity package (imposed
at the behest of the International Monetary Fund), but
the effect was enhanced by months of scandals, poor
communication, and resignations of government min-
isters. Most commentators believed that by the time
of the (unsuccessful) vote of confidence in January
2011 the party had gone beyond the point of no return.
Indeed the once dominant party in the Irish political
system was reduced to a rump party in the national
elections that followed, receiving just 15% of the vote.
A similar story can be told of theBrowngovernment,
though it weathered the financial storm relatively well;
as we have plotted in Figure 2 a series of shocks af-
fected confidence in the government, pushing it into
what we have termed the “zone of pessimism.” After
2008, Brown’s exhortations to his party at its annual
conference in 2009— “we need to fight; not bow out,
not walk away, not give in, not give up, but fight”—
were interpreted by many as a last rallying call to a
party that had given up the ghost. Indeed such calls
did little to generate a boost in performance or avoid a
heavy defeat in the election of May 2010.
Our agency model provides an account of these
events that is consistent with rational expectations.
Once an initial buffer of support is eroded ministers
anticipate that further shocks and scandals will push
the government into the abyss. With the writing on the
wall, performance falters in line with a decrease in the
value of a ministerial career. Thus the end of the gov-
ernment becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In obtaining a unique equilibrium, we also enhance
the empirical relevance of our model by providing
comparative-static predictions. An increase in x∗ fol-
lowing a parameter change corresponds to an expan-
sion in the size of the zone of pessimism. For instance,
notice immediately that x∗ is decreasing in V†, and
so, equivalently, an increase in V† helps to encourage
optimism; thus a golden handshake enhances perfor-
mance and lengthens the average tenure of ministers.
The insight here is subtle. An exogenous increase in
V† means a relative increase in the payoff associated
with a minister having served out his term relative
to being forced out of office due to negligence or
scandal. This at once makes the government’s demise
less painful from the minister’s perspective, while in-
creasing the relative cost borne should he (alone) be
forced out of the administration and the government
continues. Our comparative-static analysis tells us that,
despite the increase in the postministerial career pay-
off, the overall effect is to enhance ministerial per-
formance, government popularity, and government’s
longevity.
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FIGURE 6. Value Function and Popularity Threshold with Random Events
Notes. This figure illustrates the value function V(x) and critical popularity threshold arising from the unique equilibrium of a binary-action
world with randomly evolving popularity. The parameter choices (xL = 0, xH = 1.5, V† = 0, uL = 7, λL = 2,rL = −1, uH = 4, λH = 1,
and rH = 1) match those used in Figure 5. The value function is plotted for three different choices of σ. The bullet points “•” indicate the
location of the threshold x for these three cases. As σ → 0 the value function converges to the value function in Figure 5.
The effect of postcareer earnings on political per-
formance has been the subject of investigation. For
example, Alesina and Spear (1988) highlighted that the
last-term effect, commented on earlier, is offset when
payments made to a politician subsequent to leaving
office are conditional on last-period performance; in
their model, valuable payments to a president after
leaving office depend on the entire record of policy per-
formance. The difference in our institutional setting—
the absence of term limits and the collective nature of
the executive—means that such income effects work
via different and more subtle channels. Specifically,
an increase in V† makes a full service record more
desirable from a minister’s perspective. This means
that ministers increase their performance levels. Re-
sponding to their incentives in this way maintains the
government in office for longer. An interesting effect
is that an increase in the value of a golden handshake
delays government termination, and hence the time at
which the prize for completing a ministerial term is
realized.
Other comparative-static results also follow by in-
spection. Quite naturally, the threshold x∗ falls, and so
the size of the pessimistic world narrows, as we either
increase rH or reduce |rL|. These parameters are the
rates at which popularity rises and falls, respectively, in
the high-performance and low-performance regimes.
The responses to the flow-payoff and hazard-rate
parameters are also straightforward to obtain: x∗ is
increasing in uL and λH, but decreasing in uH and λL.
However, it is arguablymore useful to think in terms of
the baseline parameters in the low-performance world
(that is, uL and λL) together with the effect of a shift
from high to low performance (that is, the differences
uL − uH and λL − λH). The baseline parameters tell
us about the intrinsic benefits and risks of ministe-
rial positions, whereas performance-effect parameters
tell us about the relative costs and benefits of greater
performance. We record our findings as a corollary to
Proposition 4.
Corollary.Fixing the performance-effect parameters, the
threshold x∗ is decreasing in the baseline benefit uL of
holding office and increasing in the baseline risk λL.Fix-
ing the baseline parameters, x∗ is increasing in the cost
uL − uH of higher performance and decreasing in the
influence λL − λH of that performance on resignation
risk.
Further predictions are suggested by inspection of
Figure 6, which illustrates a minister’s equilibrium ca-
reer value V(x) for different values of the variance
term σ2. Note that as noise disappears, then following
the heuristic arguments made earlier, V∗ falls midway
between V(x∗) and V‡. (More generally, the location
of V∗ between these two sides of the transition point
depends on the relative size of rH and |rL|.) Around
the critical threshold even a small increase in pop-
ularity can have a large effect on ministerial career
values: Once popularity surpasses the threshold, per-
formance is high and small shocks are insufficient to
stop ministers from attaining V‡; similar observations
apply below the threshold. As noise increases (a rise
in σ) this is no longer so. Any popularity boost that
shifts performance (from low to high) faces a good
chance of being reversed. So, even when popularity
is at its highest level there remains a serious risk
that a run of bad luck will bring the administration
to its end. The implication is that greater noise re-
duces ministerial career values (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 6) and so acts as a brake on performance. A higher
threshold must then be breached before performance
switches. Indeed, and following this logic, as σ grows
large then high performance can never be attained; in
fact, the high-performance region disappears when σ is
large.
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FIGURE 7. Sample Path of Evolving Popularity
Notes. This is a sample path for evolving popularity, generated using a discrete-time approximation to our continuous-time specification.
The parameter choices (xL = 0, xH = 1.5, V† = 0, uL = 7, λL = 2,rL = −1, uH = 4, λH = 1, and rH = 1), which match those used in
Figures 5 and 6, are supplemented with a variance of σ2 = 0.5. This generates an equilibrium threshold satisfying x∗ ≈ 0.875. The
discrete-time approximation uses a time step of t = 0.005.
Our key insight is that policy shocks and disasters are
filtered via the three critical ingredients of our model:
(i) they affect confidence in the executive’s capacity
to govern effectively; (ii) they have an impact on per-
ceptions held by government ministers about the se-
curity of their tenure and hence the current value of
their political careers, and (iii) they affect executive
performance, which in turn affects (i) and (ii). Via these
mechanisms, a series of good shocks can bolster a gov-
ernment’s fortunes and lengthen its tenure, whereas a
series of negative shocks can hasten its demise.
Figure 7 reports a single simulation of evolving popu-
larity for the model specification used in earlier figures.
Initially, the government begins as a high-performance
regime. About halfway through its (realized) term,
small negative shocks push popularity to below the
threshold level. Subsequently, low performance im-
plies a downward trend until all popularity evaporates.
Importantly, if popularity is far above the threshold
level then the executive is able to withstand shocks;
close to the threshold, however, a small tremor can
spark a terminal decline. Although such paths for
government popularity are observed in political life,
dynamic models in political science that can provide
insight to such phenomenon have been, until now,
underdeveloped.
PERIODIC EVALUATION
Our model captures the interplay between longevity
and performance; we hope that our messages (multiple
self-fulfilling prophecies, randomevents allow a unique
prediction, and crises of confidence may be sparked by
a run of bad news) are robust. However, there are
situations to which our messages apply but where our
precise model structure relates less well: There are no
explicit term-length limits or elections in our model,
yet both are present in many settings of interest.
Herewemodify ourmodel to consider a government
that is subject to periodic evaluation by an electorate
or by some other principal. Most components are as
before: Each minister chooses performance to balance
flow payoff and resignation risk, and the executive’s
performance determines the evolution of popularity.
The difference is that the administration ends at a
fixed date T, so the government’s lifetime is now ex-
ogenous. However, a new endogenous element is the
outcome for ministers on the “day of reckoning” when
the government’s term ends: a minister’s terminal pay-
offV†(xT) is an increasing function of the government’s
final popularity. According to the form of V†(xT), sev-
eral applied situations can be captured.
One case of interest is when the government’s ter-
minal popularity needs to exceed a critical value x† if
it is to serve another term. For instance, x† could be in-
terpreted as the required vote share for the incumbent
to enjoy a parliamentary majority. We write V†H for the
terminal payoff of a reelected minister; this is the value
of an office in a reelected administration. Similarly,
we write V†L for the terminal payoff when the govern-
ment is defeated. Making the natural assumption that
V†L < V
†
H,
V†(xT) =
{
V†H if xT ≥ x†, and
V†L if xT < x
†.
(16)
A second case of interest is obtained by interpreting
the popularity of a government as its probability of
reelection on the date of reckoning. This leads to
V†(xT) = xTV†H + (1− xT)V†L. (17)
Simply assuming that V†(xT) is increasing is enough to
generate a feedback loop: If the government expects
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FIGURE 8. Equilibrium Popularity Paths in the Day-of-Reckoning Model
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Notes. This figure illustrates possible equilibrium paths for popularity. The upper broken line is xt (see Proposition 5). Above it, the
government always survives reelection; the top solid arrow shows such an equilibrium path, beginning from the “◦” symbol. The lower
broken line is xt (see again Proposition 5). Below, the government is always defeated; again, a solid arrow shows the equilibrium path.
Between the two broken lines, there are both “good” and “bad” equilibria. For instance, starting from the remaining “◦” symbol there
is a unique equilibrium path with growing popularity until time t = T − τ¯. However, for t > T − τ¯ there are two possibilities: popularity
continues to grow in an optimistic equilibrium, ending above x† and so justifying the optimism; or, popularity falls in a pessimistic
equilibrium, ends below x†, and the government falls.
to do well at election time (that is, xT is high) then min-
isters’ terminal careers will be valuable; this generates
higher career values earlier in the government’s term,
which induces higher performance; and, finally, such
higher performance fulfills the expectations of good re-
election prospects. Obviously, pessimistic self-fulfilling
prophecies are also possible.
Here we limit ourselves to dealing with a specific
worked-example specification. We continue with the
binary-action specification (so each minister chooses
either high or low performance at each moment of
time), and we combine this with the threshold-to-win
specification from (16) (so that a minister is reelected
at time T if xT ≥ x†, but falls with the goverment if
xT < x†). We make the assumptions that
UH > V
†
H > V
∗ > V†L,
where UH ≡ uH
λH
and V∗ ≡ uL − uH
λL − λH . (18)
Recall that V∗ is the career value needed to induce a
minister to supply high performance. The inequality
V∗ > V†L means that a minister in a goverment that
faces imminent defeat just prior to time T will be
unwilling to deliver high performance; the inequality
V†H > V
∗ ensures that a popular incumbent executive
supplies high performance close to the election date;
and the inequality UH > V
†
H means that a minister
would prefer his government to enjoy a infinitely long
term of office.
Whatmatters here is whether or notministers expect
the government to continue at time T. If they do, then
careers are valuable and ministers choose high perfor-
mance throughout the government’s term. If they do
not, then they perform highly only when their careers
are sufficiently valuable, which happens only early in
the term.
Lemma 2. Consider an environment in which the gov-
ernment is subject to periodic evaluation, and popularity
needs to exceed a threshold for the government to con-
tinue. If ministers expect reelection (xT > x†) then they
choose high performance throughout. However, if they
expect failure (xT < x†) then there is a unique length of
time
τ¯ = 1
λL
log
[
UL − V†L
UL − V∗
]
(19)
such that ministers choose high performance if and only
if t ≤ T− τ¯.
There are two types of equilibrium paths for gov-
ernment popularity. First, high performance may be
sustained throughout if terminal popularity exceeds
xT. Given that popularity increases at rate rH, a lower
bound to popularity earlier in the term is needed for
this to be an equilibrium: We need xt > x† − rH(T− t)
at time t. If this fails for some t, then the government
falls at the day of reckoning, which means that per-
formance must tail off. Second, performance may be
high (and popularity increasing) prior to T− τ¯, but
low (so that popularity wanes) afterward. For this to
be an equilibrium, popularity must fall below x† by the
end. So, for instance, we need xt < x† − rL(T− t) for
t > T− τ¯. Putting these observations together, we may
characterize the set of rational-expectations equilibria
(see Figure 8 for illustrations).
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Proposition 5. Define the upper and lower popularity
thresholds xt > xt as
xt = max
{
xL, x† − rH(T− t)
}
(20)
xt =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
min
{
xH, x† − rL(T− t)
}
for t > T− τ¯, and
min
{
xH, x† − rL(T− τ¯)
}
for t < T− τ¯,
−rH(T− τ¯ − t)
(21)
In a rational-expectations equilibrium, beginning from
time t with popularity xt: (i) if xt > xt then performance
is high, popularity rises, and the government is reelected;
(ii) if xt < xt, then performance is high and popularity
rises for t ≤ T− τ¯, but performance is low and popular-
ity falls afterward and the government is defeated at time
T; and (iii) for intermediate cases (xt < xt < xt) both (i)
and (ii) are equilibria.
In contrast to our main model, notice that there are
situations in which a “bad” equilibrium is inevitable;
if the government’s popularity is too low (if xt < xt, or
below the lower broken line in Figure 8) then there
is simply too little time for it to recover before the
day of reckoning. Such an equilibrium also has in-
teresting dynamic properties: Popularity is potentially
non-monotonic, because ministers deliver high perfor-
mance only earlier in the government’s term, when
their careers are sufficiently valuable.
NONEXISTENCE OF A
MARKOVIAN EQUILIBRIUM
Proposition 4 characterizes a unique Markovian equi-
librium. However, we still need to consider the pos-
sibility of non-Markovian equilibria in which minis-
ters’ career values and performance choices depend
on some aspect of history other than the government’s
current popularity. In the absence of random events,
Proposition 1 describes such an equilibrium, in which
popularity first rises and then falls. We have expressed
misgivings about that non-monotonic equilibrium, and
we hinted that such an equilibrium may not be ro-
bust to the presence of random shocks. Our next result
confirms that the shocks to popularity eliminate non-
Markovian equilibria.
Proposition 6. Under the conditions of Proposition 4
there are no non-Markovian equilibria, and hence the
equilibrium described in Proposition 4 is unique.
Here we limit ourselves to a brief sketch of why this
result is true. In any non-Markovian equilibrium the
career value of a minister must be at least as good
as his career value in the worst possible Markovian
equilibrium. (The worst possible equilibrium isMarko-
vian simply because it involves ministers adopting the
most pessimistic expectations irrespective of history.)
Similarly, the career valuemust benobetter thanhis ca-
reer value in the best possible Markovian equilibrium.
However, as we have shown, when random shocks are
present there is a unique Markovian equilibrium. This
ties down Markovian career values and so uniquely
defines the equilibrium career value (and behavior) of
ministers.
RELATED LITERATURE
In addition to our main contribution in providing
micro-foundations for a reciprocal causal relationship
between tenure and performance, and to our under-
standing of the dynamics of government fortunes over
time (following our introductory remarks), we high-
light three other related areas: (i) the relationship be-
tween agency and performance (ii) the determinants
of government survival, and (iii) the political and eco-
nomic analysis of common-resource-pool problems.
Our article contributes to a broad literature that
considers the effect of agency on performance. At a
basic level, government performance depends on the
qualities of office holders and their incentives, and so a
large literature has addressed aspects of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard (Barro 1973; Fearon 1999; Fere-
john 1986). Dynamic models that include both adverse
selection and moral hazard have also been developed
(Banks and Sundaram 1993; 1998). Amore recent con-
tribution that corresponds to our focus on politicians’
time horizons and their performance is that of Ash-
worth (2005). He analyzed the retention of politicians
whose abilities are unobserved by an electorate who
instead observe a politician’s record of constituency
service. In his equilibrium, “veteran” politicians pro-
vide lower levels of service though this does not have
a negative effect on their reelection probability.
Studies of agency relations in parliamentary settings
(Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2010; Dewan and
Dowding 2005; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008)
have related ministerial turnover to the arrival of new
information to a leader. In contrast Dewan and Myatt
(2007b; 2010) and Indridason andKam (2008) assessed
how the executive leader provides incentives via the
firing rule. Here we do not consider firing rules, but
instead focus on our main new contributions: an analy-
sis of the team dynamics of government performance,
a focus on strategic complementarities that arise, and
a novel resolution to a thorny equilibrium-selection
problem.
Our focus on the collective fate of the executive re-
lates our work to the literature on government survival
(Laver 2003 offers a review).We have developed a new
set of modeling techniques to analyze the dynamic pro-
cess of government duration and thereby build micro-
foundations for the “events” theory of government dis-
solution (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber 1984; 1986).
This theory relates a government’s tenure to shocks
that are beyond executive control. In earlier theoreti-
cal models (Diermeier and Stevenson 2000; Lupia and
Strøm 1995), random shocks perturb the key parame-
ters of a defined government formation game, provid-
ing incentives for an early dissolution of government.
Our model does not rely on such bargaining dynamics.
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Instead we describe more general factors that relate to
a wider set of cases including, though not limited to,
multiparty parliamentary regimes.
Movingbeyond the specific applicationof ourmodel,
our analysis yields insights into a collective action
problem. Popularity is a stock of goodwill that helps
a government to survive; it is a common-pool re-
source. Dynamicmodels of the common-pool-resource
problem have been developed in economics by
Tornell and Velasco (1992) among others. In an im-
portant and provocative contribution Kremer and
Morcom (2000) modeled the harvesting of open-access
resources. When such resources are storable (the ex-
ample of elephant-sourced ivory motivated their arti-
cle) expectations over future prices determine current
prices and so current depletion. If complete exhaus-
tion of the resource is expected then future prices are
higher; this bids up current prices; which in turn drives
up current exploitation, and so fulfills the prophecy of
extinction. In contrast, there is also a sustainable equi-
librium in which the resource survives, and so prices
and harvesting are both low. Related ideas have de-
veloped elsewhere in economics. For instance, Rowat
andDutta (2007; 2011) analyzed commons exploitation
in the presence of capital markets and found multi-
ple equilibria: Either commons exploitation is low and
the commons regenerates in steady state, or exploiters
expect exhaustion and so rush to grab the remaining
resource before it runs out, hence causing the exhaus-
tion. Where these economic models fail, however, is
in resolving the problem of multiple equilibria. In our
model the addition of random events that buffet popu-
larity provides unique predictions. Our analysis carries
over to different aspects of politics involving common-
pool resources: It could be applied fruitfully to assess
the effect of institutional rules on fiscal outcomes as an-
alyzed by Hallerberg and Marier (2004), for example.
Indeed whereas Bejar, Mukherjee, and Moore (2011)
viewed the common-resource-pool problem and short
time horizons as rival explanations for poor perfor-
mance (they assessed fiscal ill discipline) in parliamen-
tary democracies, our framework incorporates both
elements. Finally, our model may prove useful for
studying nongovernmental organizations where simi-
lar incentives are at play. An obvious example is team
sports where a string of bad luck or a series of lucky
breaks can have dramatic effects on subsequent per-
formance and success. Thus our solution opens new
possibilities for dynamic analysis of common-resource
problems in economics, political science, and beyond.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We set out to explore the determinants of a govern-
ment’s performance and longevity. Although much
empirical work is guided by insights from essentially
static models, we have provided an integrated account
of the dynamic interplay between a government’s sur-
vival and performance that sheds light on the recipro-
cal relationship between these variables. In a simple
model, multiple rational-expectations equilibria can
arise: In one, high expectations of government survival
fuel good performance that sustains government pop-
ularity and secures an indefinite term of office; but in
other equilibria, ministers coordinate around a pes-
simistic outlook on government fortunes, ministerial
career values fall, and corresponding low effort en-
sures a drop in popularity and a finitely lived govern-
ment. Augmenting the model to allow for stochastic
shocks to government popularity, however, allows for
a unique prediction. Then self-fulfilling pessimistic and
optimistic expectations can be overcome by a string of
good or bad fortune, and a unique threshold separates
the worlds of pessimism and optimism: Ministers per-
formwell (and so popularity rises in expectation) if and
only if popularity exceeds this critical threshold.
Our model makes several contributions to an un-
derstanding of dynamic government processes. First,
we show that insights from the literature on fixed
term lengths and performance travel beyond cases of
U.S. federal states to parliamentary democracies where
term length is endogenous to performance. Second,
we show that institutions generating longer time hori-
zons can have a positive effect on performance that in
turn bolsters a government’s survival prospects. Third,
our dynamic model provides a rigorous and coher-
ent framework for understanding episodes of crises of
confidence that involve the rapid collapse of govern-
ment performance and of survival prospects that occur
when a sequence of negative shocks pushes popular-
ity below a threshold. Fourth, our model provides a
rational-expectations explanation for the relationship
between random shocks and government turnover that
analysts of public opinion often attribute to superficial
irrationality by the electorate.
More generally, our model offers a methodological
contribution toward the study of dynamic collective ac-
tionproblems.Our applicationhelps theunderstanding
of executive politics and the role played by politicians’
time horizons.Herewe have studied how the time hori-
zons of ministers affect their incentives, in a situation
where they cannot outlive the government they serve
and where the government is subject to either ongoing
or periodic evaluation. Similar insights could emerge
when considering other institutions such as political
parties or family dynasties.
APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
Monotonicity of Ministerial Career Values. As the end of
government draws near, a minister’s career becomes less
valuable and so performance falls. To verify that this is so,
we combine (3) and (4). Doing so, Vit satisfies
dVit
dt
= − max
e∈[eL,eH]
[u(e)− λ(e)Vit] . (22)
The right-hand side is increasing in Vit. Hence, if the right-
hand side is positive (respectively, negative) for some t, then
Vit is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in t, which means
that it must be increasing (respectively, decreasing) for all
larger t; this observation, once developed, establishes that
Vit is monotonic in t. To check that Vit is decreasing, it is
sufficient to compare Vit at t = Ti (so that Vit = V†) and in
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the limit as Ti − t → ∞, so that Vit → V‡. By assumption
V‡ > V†, and so a minister’s career value does fall over time;
optimally chosen performance is monotonically related to
career value and so performance must also decline over
time. 
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. These results follow from argu-
ments given in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that at time t each minister
chooses performance e(xt), has a career value V(xt), and ex-
pects the government to last until T = t + τ(xt).
Some properties of a Markovian equilibrium are immedi-
ate. The executive’s remaining lifetime τ(x) must be (at least
weakly) increasing in popularity: Starting from some higher
level x′ > x, popularity must decline through the lower level
x before the government term ends and so τ(x′) ≥ τ(x). The
government may be perceived as immortal, and so there is a
“popularity threshold” x∗ ∈ [xL, xH] such that τ(x) = ∞ for
all x > x∗, but τ(x) is finite when x∗ > x > xL. If popularity
falls below the threshold then it must strictly fall over time; if
it remained constant then (because behavior is Markovian)
it would remain constant forever, sustaining the government
evermore. In sum, τ(·) is a strictly increasing function below
x∗, but becomes infinite (and so constant) above the popular-
ity threshold.
The properties of τ(x) carry over to a minister’s career
value: V(x) is a strictly increasing function for x < x∗, and
(because of the perceived immortality of the administration)
satisfies V(x) = V‡ for x > x∗. When x < x∗ we can calcu-
late V(x) by assessing the value of a minister’s career in the
pessimistic equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Such a
pessimistic path can be consistent with rational expectations
only when x < x¯, which in turn implies that the popularity
threshold must satisfy x∗ ≤ x¯. In the pessimistic zone, it is
also straightforward to characterize how a minister’s career
value changes as a function of changes in popularity. The
differential equation (3) can be modified appropriately for
this environment to yield
u(e(x))− λ(e(x))V(x)+ r(e(x))V′(x) = 0, (23)
which again stems from straightforward accounting. Within
(23), the performance term e(x) is obtained from the opti-
mality condition (4), so that
e(x) = argmax
e∈[eL,eH]
[u(e)− λ(e)V(x)] . (24)
To obtain a complete solution for V(x) for x < x∗ we need
only a condition provided by the terminal-payoff condition
at the expiration of the government’s term: V(xL) = V†. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For the binary action case eit = eL
and λ(eit) = λL so long as Ti − t < τ¯. Hence, for such times
the differential equation (22) reduces to
dVit
dt
= − [uL − λLVit] . (25)
It is straightforward to confirm that the solution for Vit given
in (7) satisfies this equation and also satisfies Vit when t = Ti .
To find τ¯ we simply set Ti − t = τ and Vit = V∗. Doing so and
solving for τ yields (8) in the statement of the proposition.
Over the final τ¯ periods of the government’s life, confidence
depletes at rate |rL|, which generates the final claim of the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4. V(x) satisfies the second-order differ-
ential equation (14),
u− λV(x)+ rV′(x)+ σ
2V′′(x)
2
= 0, (26)
where in general the terms u, λ, and r all depend on per-
formance e(x) where e(x) = argmax[u(e)− λ(e)V(x)]. Natu-
rally, without further structure we are unable to describe an
explicit general solution to this differential equation. How-
ever, for the binary-action case the terms u, λ, and r are all
locally independent of x away from the threshold x∗. Hence,
for x = x∗ the differential equation (26) is linear, and so is
easily solved. When x > x∗, this general solution is
VH(x) = α+He−β
+
Hx + α−He−β
−
Hx + γH
where β±H =
rH ±
√
r2H + 2σ2λH
σ2
and γ = uH
λH
, (27)
and where the α±H coefficients remain to be determined. Sim-
ilarly, for x < x∗,
VL(x) = α+Le−β
+
Lx + α−Le−β
−
Lx + γL
where β±L =
rL ±
√
r2L + 2σ2λL
σ2
and γ = uL
λL
. (28)
These two components to the value function solution must
join smoothly at the critical confidence threshold x∗. More-
over, at the threshold the career value of a minister must
make him indifferent between high and low performance.
Hence
VH(x∗) = VL(x∗) = V∗ and V′H(x∗) = V′L(x∗). (29)
The overall solution must also satisfy the two boundary con-
ditions discussed in the text. Using the notation introduced
here, these conditions are
VL(xL) = V† and V′H(xH) = 0. (30)
Equations (29) and (30) yieldfive equations that determine
five unknowns: the free parameters α±L and α
±
H from the value
function solutions and the confidence threshold x∗.
It is straightforward to solve for the four free parameters
α±L and α
±
H in terms of x
∗ by considering separately the two
segments of the value function. Consider the pessimistic seg-
ment. The conditions VL(xL) = V† and VL(x∗) = V∗ are
V† − γL = α+Le−β
+
LxL + α−Le−β
−
LxL
and V∗ − γL = α+Le−β
+
Lx
∗ + α−Le−β
−
Lx
∗
. (31)
These equations are linear in α+L and α
−
L , and solve straight-
forwardly:
α−L =
(γL − V†)e−β+L (x∗−xL)eβ−LxL − (γL − V∗)eβ−LxL
e−β
−
L (x
∗−xL) − e−β+L (x∗−xL)
and (32)
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α+L =
(γL − V∗)eβ+LxL − (γL − V†)e−β−L (x∗−xL)eβ+LxL
e−β
−
L (x
∗−xL) − e−β+L (x∗−xL)
. (33)
Note that V′L(x) = −β+Lα+Le−β
+
Lx − β−Lα−Le−β
−
Lx, and so
V′L(x
∗) = (β
+
L − β−L)(γL − V†)e−(β
+
L+β−L )(x∗−xL)
e−β
−
L (x
∗−xL) − e−β+L (x∗−xL)
+
(γL − V∗)
[
β−Le
−β−L (x∗−xL) − β+Le−β
+
L (x
∗−xL)
]
e−β
−
L (x
∗−xL) − e−β+L (x∗−xL)
(34)
Now consider the optimistic segment. The conditions
VH(x∗) and V′H(xH) = 0 are
V∗ − γH = α+He−β
+
Hx
∗ + α−He−β
−
Hx
∗
and 0 = β+Hα+He−β
+
HxH + β−Hα−He−β
−
HxH , (35)
and these solve to give us
α−H = −
β+H(γH − V∗)eβ
−
HxH
β+He
−β−H(x∗−xH) − β−He−β
+
H(x
∗−xH)
and (36)
α+H =
β−H(γH − V∗)eβ
+
HxH
β+He
−β−H(x∗−xH) − β−He−β
+
H(x
∗−xH)
. (37)
We can plug these solutions into V′H(x) = −β+Hα+He−β
+
Hx −
β−Hα
−
He
−β−Hx and obtain
V′H(x
∗) =
β−Hβ
+
H(γH − V∗)
[
e−β
−
H(x
∗−xH) − e−β+H(x∗−xH)
]
β+He
−β−H(x∗−xH) − β−He−β
+
H(x
∗−xH)
. (38)
So far we have obtained solutions for the value function
in both the pessimistic and optimistic worlds as a func-
tion of the critical confidence threshold x∗. These solu-
tions satisfy the relevant boundary conditions and meet at
VL(x∗) = VH(x∗) = V∗. The one remaining condition is that
V′L(x
∗) = V′H(x∗), so that the two different parts of the value
function meet smoothly at the confidence threshold. We can
use this condition to find x∗, by equating the expressions in
(34) and (38).
Clearly, we cannot obtain a general explicit solution for
x∗. However, when noise is low (so that σ2 is small) the
expressions for V′H(x
∗) and V′L(x
∗) simplify dramatically. To
proceed, first let us note the limiting values of the β±L and β
±
H
parameters as σ2 → 0:
β−H → −
λH
rH
β+H →
[
2rH
σ2
]
→ ∞
β+L →
λL
|rL| β
−
L →
[−2|rL|
σ2
]
→ −∞. (39)
(The limiting properties of β−H and β
+
L are obtained via an
application of l’Hoˆpital’s rule.) Inspecting the expression (38)
for V′H(x
∗), for x∗ < xH notice that e−β
+
H(x
∗−xH) → ∞ while
e−β
−
H(x
∗−xH) remains finite, and so the former term in both
the numerator and denominator of V′H(x
∗) dominates when
σ2 is small. This means that, for small σ2, we have V′H(x
∗) ≈
β+H(γH − V∗). More formally,
x∗ < xH ⇒ lim
σ2→0
V′H(x
∗)
σ2
= 2rH(γH − V∗). (40)
Similarly, for V′L(x
∗) in (34) and for x∗ > xL terms involving
e−β
−
L (x
∗−xL) dominate. Taking limits, we find that
x∗ > xL ⇒ lim
σ2→0
V′L(x
∗)
σ2
= 2|rL|(γL − V†)e−(λL/|rL|)(x∗−xL) − 2|rL|(γL − V∗). (41)
Equating the expressions in (40) and (41) yields the so-
lution for x∗ given in (15). The comparative-static re-
sults given in the text and the corollary are obtained by
differentiation of x∗ with respect to the parameters of
interest. 
Proof of Lemma 2. If the government survives at timeT, then
the career value of a minister is at least V†H throughout. V
†
H >
V∗ and so he delivers high performance. If the government
falls at T, then the career value continuously falls to V†L as T
approaches. Therefore in the twilight of the government’s
term, a minister delivers low performance. Recycling the
earlier analysis, Vt = UL − exp(−λL(T− t))(UL − V†L). This
is below V∗, so generating low performance, if and only
T− t < τ¯ as stated. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Performance is high and popular-
ity grows at times t < T− τ¯. For t > T− τ¯ performance is
high and popularity is growing if ministers expect xT > x†. Of
course, starting from popularity xt at time t, we need to check
that there is enough time for popularity to grow to above its
final target. This is possible if and only if xt > xt. Remaining
elements of the proposition are obtained in a similar way. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Here we sketch the argument for
why this proposition is true. For any equilibrium, what mat-
ters is the career value of aminister. (That career value can be
used to compute aminister’s performance.) Let uswrite ht for
thehistory of the government other than its popularity at time
t; thusht contains everythingother than the fundamental state
of the government’s situation. We write a minister’s equilib-
rium career value as V(xt, ht) in a possibly non-Markovian
equilibrium.
Now consider the worst possible equilibrium career value.
Starting from any time and any popularity, the set of continu-
ation equilibria depend only on xt. (Ourmodel is not formally
game-theoretic, but if it were then each time t would begin
a subgame, where that subgame would depend only on xt.)
Let us pick the worst one; that is, the one with lowest career
value and so the lowest performance. It is straightforward to
confirm that this procedure constructs a Markovian equilib-
rium, and we writeVW(xt) for the career value generated. We
can go through the same procedure and find the best possi-
ble equilibrium career value for a minister: For each point
in time and each popularity, we abandon nonfundamental
history and pick the highest continuation career value. We
write VB(xt) the corresponding best career value beginning
from xt.
Doing all this, the equilibrium career value V(xt,ht) for
a minister in a non-Markovian equilibrium must satisfy
VB(xt) ≥ V(xt, ht) ≥ VW(xt); it is better than theworstMarko-
vian equilibrium and worse than the best Markovian equi-
librium. However, when random shocks are present, there
is a unique Markovian equilibrium with a unique career
valueV(x), and soVB(xt) = VW(xt) = V(xt). Thus,V(xt, ht) =
V(xt). 
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